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ABSTRACT 
Blue Waters is the largest system that Cray has built and operates 
in a very open network environment. This paper will discuss the 
design of the Blue Waters logical administrative network and how 
that design provides a secure and reliable environment that 
separates the user and administrative access paths. The paper will 
then describe how accounts and other user and project information 
is provisioned efficiently across its 27,000+ nodes.    
CCS Concepts 
• Security and Privacy➝Security Services   • Computer 
Systems Organization➝Dependable and fault tolerant systems 
and networks.  
Keywords 
Blue Waters; Secure administrative networks; Account 
provisioning. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Blue Waters system [2-3] shown in Figure 1 is the National 
Science Foundation’s track 1 system targeting high-end scientific 
computing projects. Blue Waters provides high-end computing to 
a wide variety of open, peer-reviewed science, engineering and 
education projects. The system consists of a 27,648 node Cray 
XE/XK computer utilizing Cray’s Gemini based 3D torus high-
speed interconnect. In addition, 26PB of storage is provided by a 
432 node Cray Sonexion Lustre appliance and an ~80 node set of 
external servers provides login, data transfer and tape storage. 
Finally, the Cray XE/XK system is mirrored in one-rack, 96 node 
test system with its own control workstation. 
The mission of Blue Waters is to provide high-end computational 
science support to a very wide range of scientific disciplines. The 
majority of the time on Blue Waters is allocated by NSF via a 
normal peer-reviewed proposal process. While many science 
teams are familiar to supercomputing centers around the country 
others are in emerging fields that are new to the computational 
science community. Science team members can be located 
virtually anywhere. Some teams utilize very traditional workflows 
contained entirely within the Blue Waters system while other 
teams have complex workflows that require connectivity from the 
compute engine to systems external to Blue Waters. 
 
Figure 1: The Blue Waters System 
Large computational science problems often require very large 
input and output data sets. Some of those data sets, potentially 
PBs in size must be transferred to/from Blue Waters. Blue Waters 
supports those large data flow requirements through a set of 25 
servers dedicated to data transfer to/from the Lustre file systems 
and additional 50 servers acting as data movers for the HPSS 
environment both connected to nearly 400 Gb/s of WAN 
bandwidth to national and international backbone networks in 
Chicago. It is not practical to operate traditional firewalls or other 
packet inspection/filtering technologies at 100 Gbps link speeds 
so instead NCSA continues its practice of operating a very open 
network with many systems open to the outside network protected 
by a large Bro [4] based instruction detection and mitigation 
system. During an average month it is common for the system to 
block (black hole route) in excess of 250,000 external hosts. 
Security is an issue with any network attached system, but even 
more important for a high-profile system such as Blue Waters. A 
key security measure included in the overall security profile is the 
use of RSA One-Time-Password (OTP) fobs for authentication. 
While no one likes OTP it largely eliminates the single largest 
source of compromises on previous systems, stolen credentials. 
While NCSA had utilized two-factor login for administrative 
access previously, Blue Waters is the first system at NCSA to 
utilize two-factor devices for regular user accounts requiring 
significant additional process development. In addition to 
monitoring all external traffic the NCSA security system also 
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collects logs for many hosts and includes keystroke logging for 
the login hosts.  
2. NETWORK DESIGN 
The Blue Waters logical network layout shown in Figure 2 was 
designed taking into account many key factors. First, NCSA 
operates a very open network environment with no network 
firewalls in the network path to the general user accessible nodes 
(logins and data transfer nodes). Second, with the test system, 
external nodes, storage servers and main system there are no less 
than four separate administrative domains with the external 
servers and storage having additional redundant administrative 
servers. In addition, the Sonexion storage servers are not intended 
to allow site customization and are not properly configured (from 
a security point of view) to be exposed to a user accessible 
network. Third, a good security practice is to prevent a privilege 
escalation on a user accessible node from spreading to other 
nodes. 
 
Figure 2: Blue Waters Logical Network Diagram 
2.1 Bastion Hosts 
A good practice in any environment, but an absolute necessity 
given the complexity of the various Blue Waters administrative 
servers is the use of bastion hosts[1]. The Blue Waters bastion 
hosts are two simple Linux servers that are setup to be 
independent of all other Blue Waters infrastructure that are 
connected to the general access NCSA network and the Blue 
Waters private administrative network. While in some setups this 
sort of host is a logical bounce host, meaning the backend network 
is not physically separate, in the Blue Waters case the bastion 
hosts are the only bridge point to the public network allowing 
outside logins. A true bastion host provides an additional layer of 
security since the administrative networks including the actual 
administrative servers can be isolated from the public network. It 
is also critical to keep the bastion host very simple providing only 
basic communications to limit possible vulnerabilities. Accounts 
on the bastion hosts are manually provisioned to the bastion after 
review of the need for administrative access and are automatically 
flagged for removal upon account closure. Two separate hosts are 
provisioned to ensure continuous availability while allowing the 
bastions themselves to be updated. The bastions can provide a 
modest staging area for transfers into the administrative network, 
but separate firewall systems also allow outbound traffic to 
selected external systems. This access allows for outbound email 
and for the normal Linux system update tools to operate without 
requiring extra administrative effort. 
2.2 Privilege Escalation 
A good security practice is to limit the spread of a compromise by 
limiting the ability of root on one system from getting root on its 
neighbor. In Blue Waters that is accomplished by requiring all 
administrative access to start on an administrative machine that 
can be reached only via the bastion hosts. Administrations utilize 
their normal user account to login to the bastion (using the 
previously mentioned two-factor login) and then login to the 
administrative host of choice depending on the required task. The 
administrator can sudo to root on the administrative host and then 
can ssh out to the managed nodes as needed. Root access is only 
allowed from the administrative host out to the edge systems. The 
reverse path is not allowed, nor is lateral access between edge 
systems. 
2.3 Privilege Isolation 
Even with the previously discussed measures each administrative 
domain is kept separate with access branching out from the 
bastion hosts and no access between the branches. Thus, it is not 
possible for a privileged account on the test system to 
administratively connect to administrative hosts on the main 
system and vice versa. As will be discussed in the next section the 
same account management is used across all systems including 
the administrative hosts with access controlled by groups (and by 
the requirement for a bastion host account). The access control 
groups allow separate access lists for each administrative domain 
giving us the flexibility, for example, to allow administrative 
access to the test system without providing it to the production 
system. The only significant exception to the mixing of 
administrative networks is a host called the Integrated System 
Console (ISC) that is used to centralize the logging and metric 
collection from throughout the Blue Waters super system[7].  
3. ACCOUNT AND PROJECT 
MANAGEMENT 
Managing accounts and projects on Blue Waters is similar to other 
HPC systems except that the accounts need to be efficiently 
distributed to 27,000+ nodes. In addition to regular user 
information, groups are used to group users into allocated 
projects. An external portal allows the project lead for each 
project to add/remove users. A custom database contains 
information about all current and past users and projects including 
all usage information. The external portal drives changes to that 
database and then need to automatically flow out to the full 
system. The project groups are also used to grant access to the 
major components of the system. That access control is done via 
the standard /etc/security/access.conf file. Projects are added and 
removed from access lines in access.conf as they are awarded 
time on the system or expire. An example of the access.conf file is 
below. The current actual file has over 200 groups listed.  
However, distributing the access.conf file to nearly 80 hosts 
(logins and data transfer systems) is also impractical without 
automation. The solution was to make use of the previously 
mentioned ISC host. Changes are made on the ISC host via a web 
interface causing master access.conf, motd and an ssh banner file 
to be generated. Each host supporting external logins pulls those 
files from ISC once per minute. This interface is used not only for 
routine changes, but since it provides a very fast turnaround it is 
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Figure 3: Sample access.conf File Syntax 
also used to update access control during system outages or before 
and after system maintenance. 
Most groups are automatically generated and updated based on 
projects. However, there are also a small group of projects that are 
manually updated and are used for administrative access within 
the previously described administrative network. Those groups 
allow provided administrative privileges on each administrative 
domain. 
3.1 LDAP 
Prior to Blue Waters, NCSA used the state of the art (for 1990) 
method of account distribution of pushing out a password file 
from a central host via rsync or other sync method. Given the 
previous discussion of the complexity in the system administrative 
domains clearly makes the synced passwd file method unwieldy. 
Using the method described previously for access.conf would also 
be unlikely to scale to thousands of nodes. Instead based in part 
on two staff members previous experience LDAP was chosen to 
manage user and group information. LDAP has been proven at 
very large scale in traditional IT, but HPC resources can have 
much larger synchronized bursts of client requests (for instance at 
the time of a large job startup). LDAP allows user and group 
information to be provided uniformly across all parts of the super 
system despite different OSs and security levels including the 
Lustre file system servers that allow very limited on server 
changes. Changes are propagated very quickly limited only by the 
client cache time out. The previously mentioned custom database 
drives changes through custom scripts to make changes to LDAP. 
If an organization already had an existing LDAP system that 
could be used instead. 
Standard LDAP fields are used in both normal and custom ways. 
For example, the description field for groups contains the short 
project description used for all Blue Waters communications. 
Email addresses for each account are populated and are 
changeable by end users via the user portal. Having email 
addresses readily available also allows script driven emails for a 
variety of notifications including producing emails to all “active” 
system users.  
3.1.1 LDAP Scalability and Reliability 
A single LDAP server can handle quite a bit of traffic. However, 
to scale out to large client count and to introduce some 
redundancy for fault tolerance LDAP slave servers should be 
used. In the Blue Waters LDAP setup, a VM outside of the Blue 
Waters network is used as the single LDAP master. All changes to 
LDAP are made on this host, but it is not configured as an LDAP 
server on any clients. The LDAP clients are configured to use a 
set of seven LDAP slave servers depending on their network 
location.  The slave servers are in pairs, two on VMs external to 
the system, two on servers inside the Blue Waters administrative 
network, two on service nodes in the XE/XK compute fabric and 
one in the test system compute fabric. Clients are configured to 
connect to a nearby slave server and a second server as a backup.  
Replication is accomplished using syncrepl. This means that 
replication is initiated by the client through the ldaps protocol on 
port 636 (Pull), and no special daemon and very little 
configuration on the master is required.  Every object in the 
LDAP database has a timestamp associated with it (via the 
createTimestamp and modifyTimestamp attributes), so the 
replica-server just queries the master-server for changes since the 
newest record in the replica's database and updates changes every 
five minutes. If the replica database gets corrupted it is simple to 
recreate the database directory and copy over DB_CONFIG file 
from the corrupt directory. Restart LDAP on the slave and it will 
download the entire database from the master-server. The replicas 
are strategically placed on internal networks in close proximity to 
the compute and service nodes and includes a failover pair. There 
are also off cluster replicas in close proximity to the external 
mover nodes and Sonexion Lustre servers. In this configuration 
the system can withstand a master server failure and or network 
failures while maintaining full production. It also allows for 
rolling upgrades without downtime. 
3.1.2 Extending LDAP 
One advantage of running an independent LDAP infrastructure is 
that we are free to extend the standard LDAP schema as needed, 
though it is also possible to extend LDAP when tying into a 
central infrastructure. We have chosen to extend LDAP to track 
additional project information, both user and project quotas and 
the gridmap entry for the user. A field for a “picode” is used to 
indicate the PI or project leader, useful for correspondence and for 
staff to associate project members. The modifications to store 
quotas added a total of 12 items across the user and group 
definitions to store hard and soft block and inode quotas for each 
of the three BWs file systems. An example of these extensions are 
shown below. 
 
Initial account creation is done entirely in LDAP. When the user 
logins for the first time the home and scratch directory are created 
and user/group file system quotas are set via a customized PAM 
module. At each login the quotas are compared with LDAP and 
adjusted if a change has been made to LDAP. The gridmap entry 
is used by gsissh and gridFTP for access via certificates (limited 
to certificates signed by an authority requiring two factor 
authentication). Traditionally a flat file is generated that must be 
updated as users are added and removed. Our approach is to store 
that map entry in LDAP and have modified gsissh and gridFTP 
clients to pull the entry from LDAP.  The functionality to retrieve 
those entries from LDAP requires installation of 
Gridmap_Callouts[6].  
3.2 Account and Project Removal 
The majority of Blue Waters projects last one year. After a project 
expires there is an additional 90-day grace period to allow data 
access and transfer off of the system. Accounts and Projects are 
removed from the system for two primary reasons, security and 
storage. A good security practice is to remove access to inactive 
accounts and since users and projects on Blue Waters have 
generous storage quotas, that storage needs to be reclaimed for 
active projects. Inactive accounts can be an even larger security 
problem on systems using traditional passwords due to poor 
password protection practices of users. The use of two-factor 
authentication partially mitigates that problem, but there is an 
annual cost to maintain each token. Accounts can be removed 
from the system individually or as part of a full project removal. 
In addition, accounts can be removed from a single project, but 
remain on the system or be removed entirely. Individual account 
dn: cn={5}inetorgperson,cn=schema,cn=config 
changetype: modify 
add: olcAttributeTypes 
olcAttributeTypes: {11} ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.1.44 NAME 
'homeisquota' DESC 'Home Quota Value' EQUALITY 
integerMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 SINGLE-
VALUE ) 
 
Figure 4: Example LDAP Schema Modification 
removals are initiated by the project lead via the user portal. When 
a removal is requested the system automatically removes the 
account from the requested project. If the account has no other 
active account, full account removal follows. That process is 
partly automated, but still involves manual steps to remove the 
user’s storage and their two-factor access. Project removal is 
similar, but is only done after multiple notifications and has the 
additional step of removing project data. Currently when an 
account is removed it is fully deleted from LDAP. An alternative 
strategy could include moving the account to a “deactivated” 
LDAP space preventing access, but continuing to allow UID 
mapping to work. 
3.3 Training Accounts 
A key account management challenge for centers is dealing with 
potentially high account volume, short-duration projects used for 
training or education. This problem is compounded by the use of 
RSA one-time password tokens which have a high cost in terms of 
both the staff time to assign and distribute as well in the cost of 
the license and fobs. Since NCSA participates in workshops with 
potentially hundreds of participants a scalable alternative was 
needed. 
The solution in use today was a limited bypass of the OTP 
requirement. When a training project is provisioned generic 
(instr001, tra0023, etc) accounts are provisioned into LDAP and a 
regular password is generated for each account for a VM 
specialized for accessing Blue Waters. These accounts are only 
allowed to connect to Blue Waters through that VM and during 
the period of the workshop or class. They authenticate with 
GSISSH certificates created for the exact period of the class using 
an offline CA specific for this purpose. Upon login, the user is 
presented with links to the Terms of Service that they must agree 
to before going further.  The instructor is responsible for 
communicating appropriate use and the scope of the work, 
including any information about export control. The instructor 
will also securely distribute account information with unique 
passwords to the students, provided to the instructor. The 
following is an outline of the workflow. 
1. Create an LDAP group and project for the specific class, 
and generate certificates for the lifetime of the class. 
2. Enable accounts on the VM with gsissh and the pre-
generated certificates installed for each account.  
1. This VM will have the motd banner about the 
ToS and the click-through on the first time. 
2. Login nodes will be configured to only accept 
connections for those accounts from that VM 
(use access.conf to limit logins by incoming 
IP) 
3. Generate random local passwords for all the education 
accounts on the VM and distribute via encrypted pdf to 
the instructor and decrypt password through alternate 
delivery method to ensure security. 
4. On the first day of instruction, enable the LDAP group 
for access. 
5. After the final day of instruction, disable the LDAP 
group and accounts. Certificates will expire on their 
own. 
6. Purge home and scratch directories on lustre for each 
account after class ends 
 
3.3.1 Education Allocation Certificate Generation 
For each class a new set of certificates, signed by the offline 
NCSA CA_BW certificate authority, needs to be generated and 
deployed to the secure VM server. Most of the certificate creation 
procedures are done on a shared drive /dev/shm of an internal 
server that has large memory available and thereby won't swap 
memory to disk in any normal scenario. Solely using the memory 
prevents certain sensitive information, for example the offline 
CA's private key, from ever being written to a hard drive in an 
unencrypted format. OpenSSL is used to generate and sign the 
certificates for each of the accounts required for a given event. 
The start and end times must be less than ninety days and scoped 
to the actual training timeframe. Scripts are used to generate the 
certificates in bulk and create a tarball that is transferred to the 
secure VM. The shred command is used to safely remove files and 
from /dev/shm following successful generation and transfer of the 
certificates to the VM machine. The certificates are deployed 
under local training accounts on the secure VM that will be used 
for the training event. 
Use openssl to check the certificate validity of deployed 
certificate “openssl x509 -in ~account001/.globus/usercert.pem -
text” (verify dates on certificate) 
3.3.2 Creating Passwords and Encrypted PDF 
Account-Sheet Files 
The process to assign education user account passwords on the 
secure VM and record them into printable pages is fairly 
automated. The random passwords are generated for the training 
group members and their account enabled in the /etc/shadow file. 
An encrypted pdf is generated for each site location containing 
unique password sheets. The pdfs are emailed to each site 
moderator to be distributed during the training session. The pdf 
decryption code is relayed to each moderator through text 
message or phone call. 
 
3.3.3 Blue Waters Login Node Access   
Blue Waters has three login nodes that are in a round robin ip 
configuration. Students login with username and password to the 
secure VM. Upon login, they will be presented with links to the 
Terms of Service that they must agree to before going further. The 
training accounts are configured with rbash as a default shell on 
the VM system. The /etc/profile ends with a line calling 
/usr/sbin/bounce. The bounce script executes “ssh -Y bw” for the 
instructor and training accounts. The login nodes have gsi-
opensshd [5] configured to accept specific GSISSH certificates 
and RSA two factor authentication.  The /etc/security/access.conf 
is configured to allow the LDAP training project scoped to the ip 
of the secure VM. 
The students access the secure VM which in turn bounces them 
onto one of three identical login nodes that have shared lustre file 
systems. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Managing account and project information in an efficient and 
secure fashion is a challenge for all computational systems. This 
paper has presented the Blue Waters approach to solving these 
challenges through the use of security best practices in setting up 
an administrative network and in the use of LDAP. While other 
systems are likely smaller in scale the same techniques can be 
applied effectively on virtually any system. 
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#!/bin/bash 
if [[ $USER =~ tra[0-9]+ ]]; then 
ssh -Y bw 
kill `cat /proc/$PPID/status|grep PPid|awk '{print $2}'` 
fi 
if [[ $USER =~ instr[0-9]+ ]]; then 
ssh -Y bw 
kill `cat /proc/$PPID/status|grep PPid|awk '{print $2}'` 
fi 
Figure 5 Secure VM Bounce Script 
